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1. Introduction: Renewing Foundations
Foundations of mathematics, historically speaking, is the least stable part of this science. Pythagorean 
theorem, for example, stands firm since its early discovery while foundations of geometry (and in particular 
foundations of Pythagorean theorem) several times fall down and then have been totally renewed during the 
same historical period.  Although these changes in foundations affected the theorem there is still a sense in 
which the Pythagorean theorem always remained the same. (In the Conclusion of this paper I'll make this 
sense more precise). But foundations of mathematics underlying different versions of this theorem did not 
remain the same. The traditional view that mathematics is about number and magnitude and the modern view 
that mathematics is about sets and structures differ radically. Actually saying that different foundations differ 
radically is pleonastic since one describes a difference as radical exactly when it concerns foundations rather 
than anything else. The above observation shows that the popular architectural metaphor of science, which 
describes science as an edifice with a solid foundation, is completely misleading when one talks about 
science in a long-term historical perspective. The renewal of foundations is not only compatible with the 
progress of science but also helps to make this progress possible, as we shall now see. 
The notion of progress in science assumes that once certain knowledge is acquired it later remains preserved 
and publicly available. It happens, of course, that certain beliefs, which at some point of history are generally 
seen as elements of current scientific knowledge, are later refuted and disqualified. However the notion of 
scientific progress concerns knowledge itself, not our current beliefs about what does and what does not 
qualify as knowledge. Blurring the difference between the true knowledge and the related beliefs would 
make the notion of progress incoherent. So let me now ignore the issue of belief revision and ask a different 
question:   Where and how the ready-made knowledge is preserved and endures through human history? 
According to Popper (1978) scientific knowledge and other products of human intellect live in a special 
metaphysical domain that he calls the Third World. The First world on Popper's account is that of physical 
processes and physical objects while the Second world is that of mental states. Popper's rationale behind his 
notion of Third Worlds is to avoid reducing knowledge to either mental states or physical processes:
Knowledge in the objective sense consists not of thought processes but of thought contents. It consists of the content of 
our linguistically formulated theories; of that content which can be, at least approximately, translated from one 
language into another. The objective thought content is that which remains invariant in a reasonably good translation. 
Or more realistically put: the objective thought content is what the translator tries to keep invariant, even though he 
may at times find this task impossibly difficult. (Italic is Popper's, underlining mine)
What is relevant to our present discussion here is not Popper's metaphysical argument but the way in which 
Popper thinks about thought contents in general and the content of scientific theories in particular. As a 
matter of course Popper doesn't identify the content with its linguistic expression. He describes the content 
as an invariant of linguistic translations of a given expression from one language into another. Using today's 
popular mathematical jargon we can say that Popper thinks here of the thought content as a linguistic pattern 
taken "up to translation". 
I claim that Popper's notion of thought content fails to account for the long-term endurance of scientific, and 
in particular mathematical, knowledge. His theory better applies to the content of a religious doctrine rather 
than the scientific content. A teacher of religion may indeed translate a sacred text of his religion to his less 
educated pupils doing his best for keeping the original sense invariant. Even if the spirit of a religion 
generally doesn't reduce to its letter most developed religions use sacred texts as a means of preserving their 
identities through generations. But science proceeds very differently. A mathematical teacher - or at least a 
good mathematical teachers - doesn't try to transmit to her students the invariant content of some canonical 
text. Teaching the Pythagorean theorem today she doesn't "try to keep invariant" what Euclid has written 
about it some 2300 years ago but relies upon modern textbooks. If the notion of canonical text can make a 
sense in science at all it should be stressed that canonical scientific texts get quickly outdated, are revised, 
updated and periodically wholly rewritten (Note 1). 
Notice the difference between this latter kind of revision and the belief revision I mentioned earlier. The 
Euclid's book in its original form is no longer in use in schools not because some of Euclid's propositions 
have been judged false by education authorities. The fact that Euclid fails to meet today’s standard of 
mathematical rigor is not the reason for it either because elementary textbooks anyway do not meet and are 
not supposed to meet such a standard. The principle reason why Euclid’s Elements are no longer used in 
school is this: this book no longer provides a satisfactory basis for a study of more advanced and more 
specific branches of mathematics. It perfectly did this job for quite a while but lost this capacity when 
mathematics essentially changed its shape. This dynamics is closely related to mathematical progress but it 
cannot be described itself as a progress. Kids learning mathematics are hardly cleverer today than they were a 
century ago. Their learning capacities hardly essentially increased. But today's kids should be prepared to use 
and further develop mathematics that has been significantly progressed during the passed century. This is 
why they need a new curriculum. 
This new curriculum cannot be just an extension of an older curriculum because this would require an 
increase of pupils’ learning capacities. So they should study a different mathematics to begin with. This is 
why the evolution of elementary mathematical curricula is not progressive in the precise sense of the term. 
True, older and newer elementary mathematics textbooks typically share some material. For example older 
and newer geometry textbooks usually include the Pythagorean theorem. Here is the Pythagorean theorem as 
it appears in Euclid’s Elements (Proposition 1.47) 
(1) In right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides 
containing the right angle.
And here is how the same theorem appears in a modern textbook (Doneddu 1965, p.209, slightly modified as 
explained in Note 2)
(2) If two non-zero vectors x and y are orthogonal then (y - x)2 = y2 + x2.
A care is needed in order to interpret the two propositions correctly. Euclid speaks here not about the areas of 
the squares but about the squares themselves: saying that the two smaller squares (taken together) are equal 
to the bigger square he means, roughly, that the bigger square can be composed out of pieces of the smaller 
squares.  The minus sign on the left side of  (y - x)2 = y2 + x2 and the plus sign on its right side don't stand for 
mutually inverse operations since the former operation applies to vectors while the latter applies to real 
numbers. Vectors, numbers and operations with these things are construed here as structured sets. In order to 
interpret correctly not only the two statements but also their proofs much more should be said about their 
corresponding theories. In particular, a lot is to be said about structuralist set-theoretic foundations of 
mathematics developed in Doneddu’s book and foundations of Greek (and more specifically Euclid’s) 
mathematics. But even without going into these details it is clear that the difference between (1) and (2) is not 
that of linguistic surface. The two versions of Pythagorean theorem differ in their foundations, i.e. differ 
radically.  And yet they express the same theorem!
In the Conclusion of this paper I’ll come back to this example and say more about it. But what has been 
already said already suffices for showing that Popper’s account of thought content doesn’t apply to 
mathematics as far as this science is observed at large historical scales. Whatever the mathematical content 
might be it cannot be described as an invariant of linguistic translation; the notion of linguistic translation 
doesn’t help one to account for the long-term endurance of mathematical knowledge. The same is true for 
science in general. Unlike religious doctrines, poems, musical symphonies and some other inhabitants of 
Popper's Third World scientific knowledge endures in a long run through a permanent revision rather than a 
mere repetition of linguistic patterns or a mere retention of translational invariants as Popper suggests. Above 
I described this revision as a pedagogical necessity. But it has also a philosophical aspect. I claim that the 
continuing questioning, revision and renewal of foundations is a distinctive way in which science  endures 
through time and performs a progress. This “unended quest” (to use Popper’s word) concerns not only new 
yet unexplored domains of reality; it also concerns what is already known and well established. 
The renewal of foundations amounts to the dialectical refutation of older foundations and the dialectical 
positing of new foundations. This activity belongs to philosophy rather than to science itself. In this latter 
respect my view is traditional and qualifies as a form of foundationalism. But I also think that the notion of 
foundation does not make sense in abstraction from what it is (or supposed to be) foundation of. The 
historical performance of dialectically posited foundations crucially depends on what scientists (including 
mathematicians) do with these foundations. So my scientific foundationalism implies the need of a close 
cooperation between philosophy and science but definitely not the subordination of one of the two parties to 
the other. I subscribe under the following strong claim about the nature of scientific foundations:
A foundation makes explicit the essential general features, ingredients, and operations of a science, as well as its 
origins and generals laws of development. The purpose of making these explicit is to provide a guide to the learning, 
use, and further development of the science. A "pure" foundation that forgets this purpose and pursues a speculative 
"foundations" for its own sake is clearly a nonfoundation. (Lavwere 2003)
2. Claims and Slogans
The above generalities help me to formulate the principle purpose of this paper. I shall discuss Mathematical 
Structuralism considering it as a particular project in foundations of mathematics but not as a speculative 
view on mathematics developed for its own sake. To proponents of Mathematical Structuralism in this latter 
sense I have nothing more specific to say except that I disagree with them on more general grounds explained 
in the above Introduction. I claim that Structuralism has been extremely successful in mathematics of 20th 
century but now is already worked out and should be abandoned. Recent developments in mathematics call 
(as ever) for renewal of foundations. My more specific claim concerns Category theory. This theory emerged 
in the mid-twenty century within the structural mathematics (Note 3). Many proponents of Category theory 
believe that this theory is capable to provide better foundations for structural mathematics than the standard 
set-theoretic foundations used in the structural mathematics earlier (see Section 7 below).  I share with these 
people their enthusiasm about making Category theory into new foundations of mathematics but I don't 
believe that mathematics built on these these new foundations can or should be structural. I claim, on the 
contrary, that Category theory brings about a new understanding of mathematics, which is connected to 
Structuralism historically and dialectically but which is itself quite different. In what follows I shall try to 
present and develop this new view. I shall occasionally call this new view “categorical” but leave it to others 
to invent a new ism for it. However following a fashion I shall propose a polemical slogan. In the end of his 
(1996) Awodey puts forward the following structuralist slogan:
The subject matter of pure mathematics is invariant form, not a universe of mathematical objects consisting of logical 
atoms.
I counter this slogan with the following one:
The subject matter of pure mathematics is covariant transformation, not invariant form.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly discuss Mathematical Structuralism, its 
historical origins and its relation to Set theory and Category theory. Here I explain reasons why MacLane, 
Awodey and some other people believe that Category theory provides a support for Mathematical 
Structuralism. Then I provide my critical arguments against this view arguing that the notion of category 
should be viewed as generalization of that of structure rather than as a specific kind of structure. Further I 
analyze Lawvere's paper (1966) on categorical foundations and show that the author begins this paper with a 
version of structuralist foundations but then proceeds with a very different project that still waits to be 
accomplished.  I conclude with an attempt to outline the new categorical view on mathematics explicitly. 
3. Mathematical Structuralism
This is how a mathematical structure is described by a working mathematician for a philosophical reader:
All infinite cyclic groups are isomorphic, but this infinite group appears over and over again - in number theory, in 
ornaments, in crystallography, and in physics. Thus, the "existence" of this group is really a many-splendored matter. 
An ontological analysis of things simply called "mathematical objects" is likely to miss the real point of mathematical 
existence. (MacLane "Structure in Mathematics" 1996) 
For a philosophical reader who doesn't know what is the infinite cyclic group (and also for the sake of my 
argument) I propose a modification of MacLane's example that amounts to replacement of the words "infinite 
cyclic group" by the words "number three" and the word "isomorphic" by the word "equal":
All threes are equal but this number appears over and over again - in number theory, in ornaments [...]. Thus 
the "existence" of this number is really a many-splendored matter. [...]
 
Indeed the familiar number three is just as promiscuous as the infinite cyclic group or perhaps even more 
promiscuous. It equally "appears" (to use MacLane's word) both inside and outside mathematics: in a triple 
of apples, a triple of points, a triple of groups, a triple of numbers or a triple of anything else. Just like in 
MacLane’s example there is a systematic ambiguity in our talk about numbers between the plural and the 
singular forms of nouns. (Notice MacLane's talk about "all infinite cyclic groups" and "this infinite group" in 
the same sentence; in my paraphrase I talk similarly about a number.)  This analogy reveals a traditional 
aspect of Structuralism, which often remains unnoticed when people stress the novelty of this approach. Of 
course, this analogy doesn’t allow for reduction of Structuralism to earlier views. But it allows one to see 
clearer what was really new in Structuralism. It was not the notion of "many-splendored existence" stressed 
by MacLane in the above quote but a more specific notion of isomorphism, which plays in the structural 
mathematics roughly the same role as the notion of equality (as distinguished from identity) plays in the 
traditional mathematics. 
This point has been made clear by Hilbert in his often-quoted letter to Frege of December 29, 1899. Stressing 
the "many-splendored" nature of structural theories (as we would call them today) Hilbert says: 
"[E]ach and every theory can always be applied to the infinite number of systems of basic elements. One merely has to 
apply a univocal and reversible one-to-one transformation [to the elements of the given system] and stipulate that 
the axiom for the transformed things be correspondingly similar (quoted by Frege 1971, underlining mine)  
We see that Hilbert explicitly mentions here the reversibility condition, which implies that the given 
transformation is an isomorphism. Heller (forthcoming) quite rightly, in my view, recognizes Hilbert as a 
founder of Structuralism; however in his official definition of Mathematical Structuralism Heller doesn't 
mention isomorphisms explicitly:  
Structuralism is a view about the subject matter of mathematics according to which what matters are structural 
relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature of the related objects. Mathematics is seen as the free exploration 
of structural possibilities, primarily through creative concept formation, postulation, and deduction. The items making 
up any particular system exemplifying the structure in question are of no importance; all that matters is that they satisfy 
certain general conditions—typically spelled out in axioms defining the structure or structures of interest - 
characteristic of the branch of mathematics in question.
The reason why Heller doesn't mention the notion of isomorphism here becomes clear from his remark 
concerning "axioms defining the structure or structures [notice the plural - A.R.] of interest". Take axioms 
defining the notion of group for example. A group is any "system" (to use Heller's word) which consists of 
certain "items" a , b, ... and binary operation ! associating with every ordered pair of such items (possibly 
identical) a third item (possibly identical to one of those) from the same system such that the following 
axioms hold:
G1: operation ! is associative
G2: there exist an item 1 (called unit) such that for all a  a!1 = 1!a = a 
G3: for all a there exist a' (called inverse of a) such that a!a' = a'!a = 1 
These axioms are satisfied by many different groups. The infinite cyclic group mentioned above is just one 
example (Note 4) but there are many others. Consider, for another example, a group of permutations of three 
letters A,B,C  with the composition of permutations as group operation. This group comprises six different 
permutations (including the identical permutation). Since this latter group is finite it  cannot be isomorphic to 
the infinite cyclic group. So these two groups are different in the structural sense. This example shows that  
the above axioms  G1-3 describe structures of a particular type, not a particular structure. 
In order to give a sense to the expression "type of structures" one needs to have the notion of structure 
beforehand. Axioms G1-3 or any other system of axioms determining some type of structure cannot help one 
to grasp the notion of structure unless one is already aware about the fundamental role of isomorphism. For 
the idea of a general description satisfied by different mathematical objects is obviously not specific for 
Structuralism; Euclid's axioms do the same job with respect to numbers and magnitudes. Stressing the higher 
importance of structures with respect to "systems", the irrelevance of "intrinsic nature" and relevance of 
"structural relationships" cannot clarify the notion of mathematical structure by itself. 
4. Isomorphisms and "Invariant Forms"
A non-structuralist may observe that axioms G1-3 are satisfied by a number of "particular systems" (not 
structures so far!) called groups. Let now G be a class of such systems (i.e. groups),... and consider the 
situation when some of these, say G and G',  are isomorphic. This actually means two things: 
I1: elements of G are in one-one correspondence with elements of G' and 
I2: for all elements a, b, c from G such that a ! b = c the corresponding elements a', b', c' from G'  satisfy 
a' " b' = c'  where ! is the group operation in G and " is the group operation in G'. 
A one-one correspondence between elements of two given groups which satisfies I2 is called (group) 
isomorphism. Groups are isomorphic if and only if there exist an isomorphism between them. Notice that 
given two isomorphic groups there are, generally, many different isomorphisms between them. One should 
not confuse isomorphism as a particular correspondence between elements of two groups and isomorphism 
as an equivalence relation defined on some class of groups. Isomorphism in the latter sense holds between 
two given groups if and only if there exists an isomorphism in the former sense between these groups. As we 
can see this terminology is slightly confusing but it is too common to try to change it.   
Since  isomorphism is an equivalence relation it divides class G into sub-classes containing only isomorphic 
groups. One may ignore differences between isomorphic groups and get through this act of abstraction 
various notions of groups-qua-structures (not to be confused with the general notion of group as a type of 
structure!), in particular, the notion of infinite cyclic group. To facilitate the language and provide this 
reasoning with some intuitive support one may talk and think about any particular structure as a thing 
"shared" by all members of the corresponding isomorphism class. On this basis one may claim that "[t]he 
items making up any particular system exemplifying the structure in question are of no importance" (as does 
Hellman in the above quote).  This claim describes the aforementioned abstraction, which can be called 
structural abstraction.  However one cannot forget about these exemplifying systems completely because 
this would destroy the whole reasoning bringing about the notion of mathematical structure. Noticeably 
Hellman needs the auxiliary notion of system in order to describe what is a mathematical structure. One 
might think that this additional notion (no matter how one calls it) plays a role in a philosophical talk about 
structural mathematics but plays no role in the structural mathematics itself. In the next Section I shall argue 
that this is not the case.    
There is yet a different way of thinking about isomorphism (this will be already the third meaning of the term 
by our account!), which is common in the current mathematical practice and particularly pertinent for 
categorical mathematics as we shall later see.  One may think about a one-one correspondence between 
elements of groups G and G', which satisfies condition I2, as a transformation  i : G ! G' of one group into 
another group. Since a one-one correspondence is a symmetric construction the choice of G as the source and 
G’ as the target of this transformation is in fact arbitrary. In other words one and the same isomorphism-qua-
correspondence gives rise to two isomorphisms-qua-transformations i : G ! G' and i : G'  ! G , which go in 
the opposite directions and cancel each other on both sides. This later property means precisely the 
following:  the composition transformation i°i' resulting from the application of transformation i' after 
transformation i (Note 5) sends every element of G  into itself and composition transformation i'°i sends 
every element of G' into itself (beware that none of the two conjuncts implies the other). Given these 
conditions each of transformations i and i' is called the inverse of the other. Hence this definition: a 
transformation is called an isomorphism when it has an inverse. See (Note 9) for a more precise categorical 
version of this definition. 
Thinking about an isomorphism as a reversible transformation allows one to think of a structure shared by 
given transformed systems as an “invariant form”, i.e. a form invariant under the given transformation. 
Hence Awodey's structuralist slogan quoted in the end of Section 2.  This slogan describes the structural 
abstraction in these alternative terms: only the invariant form matters, transformed systems don’t.  As we 
shall see in what follows the notion of isomorphism-qua-transformation, which may seem redundant in the 
context introduced so far, becomes indispensable in categorical mathematics. Noticeably Hilbert in the above 
quote (Section 3) talks about isomorphism as transformation, not as a symmetric one-one correspondence.   
5. Structures versus Abstract Objects; Collections versus Transformations
Given an equivalence relation defined on a class of mathematical objects Frege (1884) considered a 
possibility of replacing each obtained equivalence class by a single object through an act of abstraction (Note 
6). Frege calls the result of this procedure an abstract object, not a structure, and indeed he doesn't think 
about this outcome as a structure. So we need a further effort for distinguishing structural  abstraction from 
other types of mathematical abstraction. For this end let us first consider this question: What are elements of 
a group-qua-structure? For the reason that I have already explain we don't want these elements to have 
anything like "intrinsic nature". So they should be just "items" or "abstract elements"; the predicate "abstract" 
refers here to the act of abstraction through which the notion of group-qua-structure is obtained. However we 
still need to make some assumptions about these things. We want them to be many and form (or belong to) 
well-distinguishable collections. Since we want to use the same notion of collection for different purposes we 
don’t want the collected elements to hold relations. This will give us the freedom to stipulate any relation 
between elements by a fiat using the same notion of collection.    
This is an important point where Structuralism meets Set theory. Having a notion of set in our disposal we 
are in a position to give the standard structural definition of group as a “structured set”, namely a set 
provided with a binary operation satisfying axioms G1-3 given above. (There is a standard way to account 
for algebraic operations as relations that I shall not explain here.) 
As we have seen the notion of isomorphism plays a crucial role in the structural abstraction. However one 
might expect that since an act of such abstraction is accomplished this notion will no longer play any role in 
the structural mathematics. But evidently this is not the case. Mathematicians think about abstract groups and 
other abstract structures as given in an indefinite number of isomorphic copies, not as unique objects. As I 
have already stressed, people think similarly about numbers in the traditional arithmetic (see Section 3). This, 
in my view, is the principle point where Frege's notion of abstraction fails to account for the structural 
abstraction as this latter notion has been developed in mathematics of 20th century. Reasoning "up to 
isomorphism" doesn't amount to the strict identification of isomorphic structures; it rather amounts to 
relaxing the notion of identity up to that of isomorphism in appropriate contexts. From a mathematical (as 
distinguished from logical and philosophical) viewpoint the question whether or not two structures are 
identical is just as pointless as the question whether or not two equal numbers are identical. A sound 
mathematical question about two given numbers is whether or not they are equal. A sound mathematical 
question about two given structures is whether or not they are isomorphic (Note 7). 
Set theory makes the talk of isomorphism as transformation redundant because the notion of one-one 
correspondence may be analyzed set-theoretically in terms of pairs of elements. However in many important  
mathematical contexts the notion of transformation is widely used anyway: groups of (reversible) 
transformations are abundant and geometry and also in physics. As far as foundations of mathematics are 
concerned we have an important choice here: either to (i) consider the notion of collection as more 
fundamental than that of transformation and reduce the latter to the former or to (ii) consider the notion of 
transformation as more fundamental and reconstruct the notion of collection on this basis. The former option 
brings (some version of) set-theoretic foundations of mathematics. The idea of categorical (i.e. category-
theoretic) foundations amounts to taking the latter option. However the project turns to be non-viable unless 
one takes into the account other transformations than isomorphisms.  
6. Homomorphisms
Given a type of structures there is a standard way to define a general notion of map between structures of the 
given type. The term "homomorphism" is traditionally reserved for groups (apparently because this case has 
been studied first) although, as its etymology suggests, it could also be used for structures of different types 
like the term "isomorphism". In what follows I shall discuss only the case of groups but what I am going to 
say generalizes straightforwardly to structures of any other type.   
The notion of group homomorphism generalizes upon that of group isomorphism in the following way: 
instead of one-one correspondence between elements of groups G, G' one considers a more general kind of 
correspondence that is allowed to be many-one but not one-many. In other words one consider a function
(in the set-theoretic sense of the term) f: S!S' from the set S of elements of G to the set S' of elements of G'. 
Condition I2 from Section 4 remains the same; notice that it can be satisfied when elements a, b are different 
but elements a', b' are the same.     
Group homomorphism and similar general maps between structures of other types are colloquially called 
"structure preserving". This is somewhat misleading because if such maps preserve anything at all this is a 
type of structure but not a particular structure. Think about this trivial example: for all groups G, G' there 
exist a homomorphism h :G!G' , which sends every element of G to the unit of G'.  This homomorphism 
"destroys all information" about G reducing its image to a single element;  it doesn't provide any information 
about G' either. I shall now argue that homomorphisms, generally, don't allow for invariants in anything like 
the same sense, in which isomorphisms do so. This shows, in my view, that the usual way of thinking about 
homomorphisms as "imperfect isomorphisms" is based on a wrong analogy, which easily leads to serious 
conceptual mistakes.
Let us try to replace isomorphisms by homomorphisms in the process of structural abstraction described in 
Section 4 and see what happens. One might expect to get in this way a generalized notion of structure but this 
doesn't work. Remind the first step: given class G of groups we have divided it into equivalence subclasses of 
isomorphic groups. Two groups are isomorphic if and only if there exist an isomorphism (i.e. a reversible 
transformation) between them; clearly this is an equivalence relation. Let me (for the sake of the argument) 
call two groups homomorphic if and only if there is a homomorphism between them. Although this latter 
relation is also an equivalence one can see the difference: since all groups are homomorphic (see the above 
example of group homomorphism) one cannot use this equivalence for dividing G into equivalence 
subclasses! Saying that two given groups are homomorphic is tantamount to saying that the given groups are 
groups. So the relation of homomorphism just introduced (not to be confused with the standard notion of 
homomorphism as transformation) doesn't make sense.  
In order to see the reason of this failure observe that the existence of homomorphism of the form h :G!G'  
doesn't imply the existence of homomorphism of the form h :G'!G. This means that in the case of 
homomorphism (unlike that of isomorphism) the difference between the source and the target of the given 
transformation matters. But the relation of homomorphism tentatively introduced above doesn't take this 
difference into the account. It forgets the difference between isomorphic and non-isomorphic groups and thus 
confuses their structural properties offering no replacement.  
A more reasonable choice of relation associated with a given homomorphism h :G!G' would be that of non-
symmetrical relation > such that G>G' holds just in case there is a homomorphism of the form h :G!G'. 
However since > is asymmetric it is not an equivalence and so doesn't allow one to proceed further with the 
structural abstraction or anything similar. 
We see that homomorphisms cannot do the same job as isomorphisms: the reversibility condition mentioned 
by Hilbert in the above quote (Section 3) turns to be crucial for the structural abstraction. One cannot reason 
"up to homomorphism" in anything like the same way in which people reason up to isomorphism doing 
structural mathematics. Since "invariant" in the given context is just another word for structure it is clear that 
homomorphisms, generally, don't have invariants in anything like the same sense, in which isomorphisms and 
groups of isomorphisms do so (Note 8).  
7. Structuralists Motivations behind Category Theory
The emergence of Category theory in 1940-ies and its further development in the context of structural 
mathematics was related to a growing awareness of the role of general maps (not only isomorphisms). I shall 
not explain here the precise mathematical context in which this theory first proved useful but only mention 
that the notion of category generalizes upon such examples as the class of all sets and all functions, all groups 
and all group homomorphisms, all topological spaces and all continuous maps (not only reversible ones!) 
between topological spaces. This is a simple theorem (MacLane 1996) that a class of structures of any fixed 
type provided with the corresponding notion of general map form a category. Generally a category comprises 
a class of objects and a class of composable maps (called in Category theory morphisms) for every ordered 
pair of objects, which are subject to few natural axioms. Given two different categories one defines a notion 
of map between categories. Such maps are called functors;  the usual definition of functor is based on the 
same idea as the definition of group homomorphism given in the previous Section: a functor sends each 
object of the source category into an object of the target category and each morphism of the source category 
into a morphism of the target category in such a way that composition of morphisms is "preserved" in the 
same sense in which the group operation is said to be preserved by a group homomorphism. Using the notion 
of functor one may consider various categories of categories, i.e. categories such that their objects are 
themselves categories. One may also consider categories objects of which are functors. The above standard 
description of basic categorical concepts is structuralist in its spirit. In Section 11 I shall describe functors 
and categories anew from a foundational and “more categorical” viewpoint. 
The idea of categorical foundations as viewed from a structuralist perspective amounts to recovering of all 
the relevant properties of any structure of any given type through properties of the category of (all) structures 
of this given type. In the case of the category of sets this provides an alternative (category-theoretic) Set 
theory: one first conceives of sets as abstract objects and stipulates that they form a category; then one 
stipulates desired properties of this category, which make this category "into" the intended category of sets. 
This result (see Lawvere 1964) shows that a reasonable notion of collection (set) can be developed on the 
basis of that of transformation (morphism of sets) but not only the other way round. 
 
The growing popularity of Category theory as a common (albeit certainly not unique) "language" of today's 
mathematics as well as the continuing efforts of building categorical foundations of mathematics are 
generally seen as a further step of the structuralist project briefly described above. I agree with this view as 
far as it does not require to preserve the basic principles of Mathematical Structuralism in the new categorical 
setting. In my understanding these developments diverge from Mathematical Structuralism and tend towards 
a very different view on mathematics and science in general. Before I shall describe this new view let me 
explain reasons why categorical foundations appear to many as a version of structural foundations. In the 
next Section I shall show that this appearance is wrong.       
As I have already explained in Section 5 the notion of set plays a special role in the structural mathematics. 
This explains why Set theory itself is rarely seen as a structural theory on equal footing with, say, Group 
theory. As Hellman rightly remarks:
[D]espite the multiplicity of set theories (differing over axioms such as wellfoundedness, choice, large cardinals, 
constructibility, and others), the axioms are standardly read as assertions of truths about “the real world of sets” rather 
than receiving a structuralist treatment. (op. cit.) 
The structural notion of group explained above is usually construed as a "set with a structure" or "structured 
set" rather than a pure structure (whatever this might mean); the underlying set of a given group is thought of 
as a background supporting the structure rather than a part of this structure. This way in which 
mathematicians think about structures reminds of Aristotle's metaphysics of Matter and Form. The need of 
the set-theoretic Matter for doing structural mathematics becomes clear from our analysis given in the 
Section 5 but the presence of this ingredient doesn’t fully comply with the philosophy of Mathematical 
Structuralism, which purports to make mathematical objects into pure forms (structures) and leave anything 
like the “background” outside mathematics. The desired "purely structural" mathematics would deal only 
with the “invariant Form” and require no set-theoretic Matter. Here is a historical evidence of such attitude. 
Talking about set-theoretic difficulties Dieudonne (under the name of Bourbaki) says in his structuralist 
manifesto (Bourbaki 1950):
The difficulties did not disappear until the notion of set itself disappears <...> in the light of the recent work on the 
logical formalism. From this new point of view mathematical structures become, properly speaking, the only "objects" 
of mathematics.
I don't believe that Dieudonne’s claim concerning the alleged "disappearance" of sets is justified but the 
quote clearly demonstrates such intention. 
In this context the idea of accounting for relevant properties of mathematical structures only in terms of 
structure-preserving maps between these structures independently of any set-theoretic background, i.e. the 
idea of categorical foundations, indeed looked like a further step in the structuralist direction. Hence the 
popular view according to which the categorical mathematics is the desired purely structural mathematics. 
Remarkably Category theory did never make it into Bourbaki's Elements (1939 - 1983), which is the most 
systematic attempt to develop structural mathematics ever undertaken. This is in spite of the fact that both 
founders of Category theory, Eilenberg and MacLane, were eventually involved into the Bourbaki group, so 
all the principle members of this group were well aware about their work.  This fact is often seen as a 
historical puzzle but in my view it is not. For categorical foundations of mathematic are not and cannot be 
anything like the structural foundations developed by Bourbaki in his fundamental work. The purpose of the 
following Sections is to justify this claim and suggest an alternative. 
8. Categories versus Structures; Embodiement of Mathematical Concepts
Categories of structures like the category of groups, topological spaces, etc. capture the notion of type of 
structure, not the notion of singular structure. Particular structures (identified up to isomorphism) may be 
often also rendered as categories but in this case their morphisms are no longer structure-preserving maps. 
For example, a particular group (like the infinite cyclic group mentioned above) can be presented as a 
category with just one object such that all of its morphisms (going from this object to itself) are 
isomorphisms. The group operation is given by composition of morphisms; the existence of unit follows 
from the definition of a (general) category and the existence of inverse elements follows from the fact that all 
morphisms of the given category are reversible (Note 9). This construction can be pictured as follows:
                                    
This simple example shows that categorical morphisms can but should not be structure-preserving maps. 
Moreover the above categorical presentation of group unlike its standard set-theoretic presentation is not 
structuralist in its character. For the standard structuralist presentation involves this idea: an abstract group 
can be "exemplified" by what Hellman calls "particular systems" like systems of numbers, systems of 
geometrical motions and so on and so forth. Of course, when one pictures elements of a given group as loops 
rather than dots this does produce any conceptual change by itself. But given the above categorical 
presentation of a group and using standard category-theoretic means one can do somethings different than 
keep saying that morphisms of the given category (i.e. the given group) stand or may stand for something 
else than themselves. Namely, one may consider functors from the given group-category into some other 
categories, which in their turn present (rings or fields of) numbers, geometrical spaces, etc. This provides a 
much more precise idea of “standing for” in each particular case than the general structuralist rhetoric. In the 
structuralist setting the notion of exemplification remains meta-theoretical and escapes a precise 
mathematical treatment. But in the categorical setting this notion becomes a proper part of the given 
mathematical construction. Instead of saying that A stands for B one considers functors of the form A!B and 
treats these functors on equal footing with 'internal" morphisms of A and B (Note 10). 
In my understanding this latter type of mathematical thinking has little if anything to do with the structural 
abstraction. A principle epistemic strategy of Structuralism is to capture what various "particular systems" 
share in common, namely their "shared structure". The corresponding categorical strategy can be described in 
this way: look how "particular systems" translate into each other. Unlike the structuralist strategy this 
categorical strategy doesn't make the particular systems less important. Given morphism A!B there is, 
generally, no reason to think of A and B  "up to" some equivalence and dispense with A and B  in favor of 
their shared structure or anything else.  As I have already shown in Section 6 the notion of thinking “up to 
homomorphism” is plainly unsound. 
Let us now consider the case when a category presents a type of structure rather than a singular structure. To 
analyze this case I shall use the notion of embodiement, which I have introduced elsewhere (see Rodin, 
forthcoming). As we have seen in Section 5 a mathematical structure cannot be identified with its 
corresponding abstract concept: something else is needed in order to make a given concept into a 
mathematical object. Kant would call this additional element an intuitive construction; I use the word 
"embodiement" for a similar purpose but in a different mathematical context. We have seen how the notion of 
structure allows for making a concept describing different "particular systems" into a single mathematical 
object (single up to isomorphism, of course). As we have seen in Section 6 this structuralist method of 
embodiement doesn't work for types of structure. While the concept "infinite cyclic group" can be embodied 
into a single structure, the concept "group" cannot; "the group" unlike "the infinite cyclic group" is not a 
name of unique (up to isomorphism or otherwise) mathematical object. However the category of (all) groups 
is a single mathematical object like number 3, the infinite cyclic group or, say, the Euclidean plane. Each of 
these objects has a "many-splendored existence" (to use MacLane's word), so its singleness must be 
understood appropriately. But I want now to stress a different point: the way in which all isomorphic cyclic 
groups are made into a single object with the notion of structure and the way in which all groups are made 
into a single object with the notion of category are essentially different. While the former involves the 
structural abstraction the latter involves a different kind of abstraction, which I shall call categorical. 
Roughly, the categorical abstraction amounts to the following: one forgets about the fact that groups have 
elements and consider only how they map to (i.e. transform into) each other with appropriate morphisms; a 
relevant notion of element is recovered in this categorical setting only later on. Obviously the two kinds of 
abstraction are quite different. I shall say more on the categorical abstraction in the Conclusion.  
A category in which morphisms (including identity morphisms) form a set (in the technical sense of the term) 
is called small. Small categories can be thought of as structures on their own. The corresponding type of 
structures is defined straightforwardly: one takes a set of of elements called morphisms, introduces 
appropriate primitive relations on this set and spells out the needed axioms (see the next Section for more 
details). Thus small categories like groups can be thought of as structures of a specific type. Noticeably this 
straightforward approach doesn't go through in the case of large categories corresponding to types of 
structures - think again of the category of groups or the category of all small categories. Since morphisms of 
such categories form classes which are not sets they cannot be described as structured sets. Although this 
may look like a minor technical difficulty, which can be resolved by an appropriate generalization of the 
usual notion of structure, this difficulty provides an additional evidence that the structural approach, 
generally, doesn't work in Category theory. Instead of thinking of categories as structures (or generalized 
structures) of a particular type it seems me more reasonable to reverse the order of ideas and think of 
structures as categories or categorial constructions of a particular type. An immediate suggestion would be to 
identify structures with small categories. A more elaborated suggestion due to Lawvere (a personal talk) is to 
identify a structure with a functor from a small category to a large "background" category, say, that of sets. 
To conclude this Section let me stress that categories don't always represent particular structures or particular 
types of structure. Examples of this latter kind are today so popular only because they connect the new 
categorical mathematics with the older structuralist mathematics, which is nowadays widespread and well-
established. But the categorical mathematics also involves concepts and constructions that have been first 
developed in a categorical setting, for example that of Grothendieck topology. One may expect that the 
further development of categorical mathematics will make such "purely categorical" concepts better known 
and more useful in various branches of mathematics; then the link between the categorical mathematics and 
its structural predecessor will become a historical and philosophical rather than mathematical issue.   
9. “The category of categories” 
The idea of categorical foundations amounts to taking the notions of category, functor and/or some other 
related categorical notions as primitive and recovering the rest of mathematics on this basis. What are 
possible ways of realizing this project? In which precise sense one can consider category-theoretic notions as 
primitive? A way to do this, which immediately suggests itself, is to use in categorical foundations a modern 
version of Hilbert-style axiomatic method after the example of standard set-theoretic foundations. 
Consider a class of things called morphisms and three primitive relations: one that associates with every 
given morphism its source, one that associates with every given morphism its target and, finally, one that 
associates with some (ordered) pairs of morphisms a third morphism called the composition of the given two 
morphisms. Then we need axioms to ensure that sources and targets of morphisms behave as identity 
morphisms (i.e. as objects), that two given morphisms are composable if and only if the target of the first 
morphism coincides with the source of the second morphism, and some other similar axioms. Finally we 
should assume that the composition of morphisms is associative. For the full list of such axioms I refer the 
reader to (Lawvere 1966). The axiomatic theory  just described this author calls the elementary theory of 
abstract categories.
This Lawvere's paper begins as follows:
In the mathematical development of recent decades one sees clearly the rise of the conviction that the relevant 
properties of mathematical objects are those which can be stated in terms of their abstract structure rather than in terms 
of the elements which the objects were thought to be made of. The question thus naturally arises whether one can give 
a foundation for mathematics which expresses wholeheartedly this conviction concerning what mathematics is about, 
and in particular in which classes and membership in classes do not play any role. 
We see that Lawvere embraces Mathematical Structuralism here but at the same time rejects set-theoretic 
(and even more general class-based) foundations of mathematics. Since the Hilbert-style axiomatic method is 
essentially structural (see Section 3 above) Lawvere's method of building his elementary theory of abstract 
categories perfectly  fits his announced purpose. After the introduction of the axioms of the elementary 
theory and providing some definitions on their basis Lawvere says:
By a category we of course understand (intuitively) any structure which is an interpretation of the elementary theory of 
abstract categories, and by a functor we understand (intuitively) any triple consisting of two categories and a rule T 
which assigns, to each morphism x of the first category, a unique morphism xT of the second category in such a way 
that ...   [follow the conditions of being "structure-preserving" ]
A problematic aspect of this first part of the paper concerns Mayberry's argument  who claims that Lawvere's  
elementary theory like any other theory built with the Hilbert-style axiomatic method requires some primitive 
(non-axiomatic) notion of collection, which cannot be identified with that of category (Mayberry 2000). The 
argument implies that the elementary theory and the corresponding elementary notion of category cannot be a 
genuine foundation. I agree with Mayberry on this point (this follows from my understanding of the 
relationships between Structuralism and Set theory explained in the beginning of Section 5) but unlike 
Mayberry I think that such primitive notion of collection is dispensable in foundations of mathematics along 
with the Hilbert-style structural axiomatic method itself. In what follows I shall sketch a different version of 
axiomatic method that seems me more appropriate for categorical foundations. Let me now return to 
(Lawvere 1966).  
Lawvere's elementary theory is a preparatory step towards another theory of categories, which Lawvere calls 
basic theory. I claim that unlike the elementary theory the basic theory is not structural, at least not in a 
similar sense. If I am right this shows that the main content of (Lawvere 1966) in fact doesn't agree with the 
structuralist agenda announced by the author in the beginning of this paper: Lawvere begins his paper with a 
structural reasoning but then proceeds with a very different agenda, which can be described as genuinely 
categorical. 
The basic theory begins with a re-introduction of the notion of functor:
Of course, now that we are in the category of categories, the things denoted by the capitals will be called categories 
rather than objects, and we shall speak of functors rather than morphisms.
This may sound like a mere terminological convention (rather than an alternative definition) but in fact it 
signifies a sharp change of the viewpoint. The idea is now the following: given a preliminary notion of 
category (through the elementary theory) conceive of category C of "all" categories; then pick up from C an 
arbitrary object A (i.e. an arbitrary category) and finally specify A as a category by internal means of C 
stipulating additional properties of C when needed. More precisely it goes as follows (I omit details and 
streamline the argument). Stipulate the existence of terminal object 1 in C, i.e. the object with exactly one 
incoming functor from each object of C . Then identify objects (= identity functors) of A as functors in C of 
the form 1!A. Stipulate also the existence of initial object 0, i.e. the object with exactly one outgoing 
functor into each object of C .  Then consider in C object 2 of the form 0!1  and stipulate for it some 
additional properties among which is following: 2 is universal generator which means that
G (generator):  for all f, g:  A!B   and f " g there exist x such that x: 2!A!B and xf " xg
and
U (universal): if any other category N has the same property than there are y, z such that  y, z: 2⇄N  
and  yz = 2. 
This allows Lawvere to identify functors (morphisms) of A as functors of the form 2!A in C. The fact that 2 
is the universal generator (as follows from the above definition it is unique up to isomorphism) assures that 
categories are determined "arrow-wise": two categories coincide if and only if they coincide on all their 
arrows. This new definition of functor also allows one to make a sense of the notion of a component of a 
given functor of the form h: A!B , which in the elementary theory is understood as a map m sending a 
particular morphism f of A into a particular morphism g of B . In the basic theory m turns into this 
commutative  triangle (Note 11):
                                 
This, once again, significantly changes the whole perspective: categories and functors are no longer built 
"from their elements" but rather "split them into" their elements when appropriate. Although the notion of 
functor as a structure-preserving map can be recovered in this new context it no longer serves for defining the 
very notion of functor. Rule T used by Lawvere for defining functors in the elementary theory disappears in 
the basic theory without leaving any trace.   
Further consider this triangle which Lawvere denotes 3 :      
(it should satisfy a universal property which I omit.)
3 serves for defining composition of morphisms in our "test-category" A as a functor of the form 3!A in C. 
Finally, in order to assure the associativity of the composition Lawvere introduces category 4 that is pictured 
as follows:
(The associativity concerns here the path  0!1!2!3 )
This construction provided with appropriate axioms makes A into an "internal model" of the elementary 
theory in the following precise sense: If F is any theorem of the elementary theory then "for all A, A satisfies 
F" is a theorem of the basic theory (Note 12).
10. Functorial semantics and Sketch theory
In order to see that Lawvere's basic theory unlike his elementary theory is not based on structuralist 
principles, and then to get an idea of non-structuralist principles behind this theory, it is instructive to take 
into consideration two similar approaches: functorial semantics developed by the same author elsewhere 
(Lawvere  1963-2004) and Sketch theory founded by Ch. Ehresmann in 1960-ies and later developed by other 
people (see Wells 1993 for an overview and further references).  
Functorial semantics involves the presentation of mathematical theories as categories of a special sort;  
models of a given theory are functors from the theory to the background category of sets or another 
appropriate topos. The very idea of "interpretation" or "realization" of a given theory in a set-theoretic 
background obviously comes from the standard (due to Tarski) Model theory.  Lawvere's functorial semantic 
can be seen as a category-theoretic version of the same basic construction. However as we shall now see this 
technical update comes with  a significant revision of the structuralist background behind Tarski’s Model 
theory, which this later theory inherits from Hilbert’s notion of axiomatic method. 
In order to determine a theoretical structure an axiomatic theory should  be categorical , i.e. to have models 
that are all isomorphic. (Beware that this older sense of the term "categorical" has nothing to do with 
Category theory!). True, not all axiomatic theories built by the standard method satisfy this requirement; also 
true, non-categorical theories are usually not disqualified solely on this basis. Anyway in the standard setting 
the categoricity of axiomatic theory is commonly (and usually as a matter of course) viewed as an epistemic 
gain while the lack of categoricity is viewed as a problem. As far as one commits oneself to Structuralism 
such attitude is understandable:  when a set of axioms fails to specify a model up to isomorphism it fails to 
specify a structure. Saying that a non-categorical theory determines many structures rather than one structure 
is somewhat misleading because such a theory, strictly speaking, doesn’t specify any structure at all (cf. 
Section 3 above).  
In the case of Lawvere's functorial semantics the structuralist pursuit of categoricity turns into an absurdity. 
For the purpose of this construction is to produce a workable category of models rather than just one model 
up to isomorphism. In the functorial setting  a theory determines a category, not a structure. This makes the 
structuralist thinking behind the axiomatic method as expressed by Hilbert in the above quote (Section 3) 
irrelevant. In the new setting 
The theory appears itself as a generic model. (Lawvere 1963 - 2004, Commentary of 2004)
This means that the older structuralist distinction between abstract "formal" axiomatic theories, on the one 
hand, and their semantic, on the other hand, doesn't apply; what distinguishes a theory form its (other) 
models is its generic character rather than formal or abstract character.  
The setting of Sketch theory is similar to that of Lawvere’s functorial semantics but in the former case 
generic categories are designed as "generic shapes" or "generic figures" rather than axiomatic theories. 
Unlike the case of functorial semantics such generic categories are not supposed to have logical properties; in 
some approaches sketches are not even categories but directed graphs with an additional structure. It seems 
natural to think of sketches as "proto-structures" but this is somewhat misleading as far as the usual notion of 
structure is concerned. A  sketch doesn't represent a bunch of isomorphic systems but generates non-
isomorphic systems (its models). These generated systems share their shape not  in in the same sense, in 
which different systems are told to share the same mathematical structure.  In fact they share a shape in a 
more straightforward sense: the given sketch is their common source. To "have the same source" is obviously 
an equivalence relation but this particular equivalence relation doesn't support anything like the structural 
abstraction. Unlike a shared structure a shared sketch is  concrete (it is usually even supposed to be finite and 
easily pictured) while things generated by a sketch can be indeed described as abstract structures in the older 
sense because they are usually distinguished only up to isomorphism! Thus Sketch theory turns Structuralism 
upside down (Note 13) and in certain aspects reminds of more traditional ways of doing mathematics. 
Euclid's geometrical universe is generated by two generic figures, namely, the straight line and the circle, 
which is tantamount to saying that every geometrical object is constructed  by ruler and compass. The 
analogy seems me straightforward.
11. Categorical foundations
Whether or not the new categorical approach to theory-building differently realized in functorial semantics, 
Sketch theory and the basic theory of (Lawvere 1966) can compete with the standard Hilbert-style structural 
approach depends on whether or not the categorical approach is self-sustained. The considered constructions 
doesn't allow one to claim that this is indeed the case: we have seen that Lawevere's  basic theory depends on 
the structural elementary theory, functorial semantics is developed by this author similarly in two steps, and 
Sketch theory in its existing form uses Set theory and usually doesn't make foundational claims at all. I shall 
not present here an accomplished version of (non-structural) categorical foundations but try to specify what 
remains to be done in order to accomplish this project. 
Let's see what the first structural layer of (Lawvere's 1966) serves for. First of all it helps Lawvere to 
introduce the notion of category, on which the basic theory further elaborates. In order to see that the notion 
of category can be first introduced without the structural elementary theory remind the following feature of 
the standard set-theoretic foundations: to build an axiomatic theory of sets like ZF one needs a pre-theoretical 
notion of set or collection to begin with (cf. Mayberry’s argument in Section 9 above). Axioms of Set theory 
make this pre-theoretical notion of collection more specific and more precise saving it from known 
paradoxes. But they don’t produce sets ex nihilo. Categorical foundations can and should, in my view, be 
built similarly: one begins with an informal intuitive notion of category and then use it for making this very 
notion more precise and better behaved. Such circularity is not vicious in the case of sets and it is not vicious 
in the case of categories either.   
It may be argued that unlike the notion of collection that can be illustrated with everyday examples like that 
of a set of chairs the notion of category requires a much higher level of mathematical abstraction. I think this 
is a wrong impression due to the fact that popular examples of categories involve topological spaces, vector 
spaces and similar things about which a beginner cannot possibly know. As far as categories are supposed to 
provide foundations of mathematics they should be certainly introduced differently. Remind that the notion 
of set also first emerged in rather involved mathematical contexts; the idea that a set of chairs falls under the 
same concept came about later with the project of set-theoretic foundations of mathematics (Note 14). The 
development of so-called “naive” notion of set was as much important for this project as the development of 
axiomatic theories of sets like ZF; the latter part of the project wouldn’t be possible without the former. 
Categorical foundations of mathematics require a similar job. Let me now make an attempt to develop a 
primitive notion of category. It may happen that pushing the project of categorical foundations further 
forward will bring primitive categorical notions other than the standard notions of functor and category. Here 
I shall stick to the standard notions and only hint to some possible alternative developments, which in my 
view are worth studying.  
Our  basic concept will be that of transformation otherwise called functor. Spatial motion is an important 
example of transformation but it should be stressed that this case is special because any such motion (except 
a travel into a black hole) is reversible while a categorical functor is generally not (Note 15). So talking about 
transformations we shall also think about non-reversible transformations like that of a caterpillar’s egg into a 
caterpillar into a butterfly. This example is helpful because the transformation in question is repeatable albeit 
irreversible. We need this sort of repeatability of our transformations since otherwise one cannot do with 
them anything like mathematics! (I’ll say more about this in the Conclusion.) We shall use arrows for 
picturing transformations. 
The next basic notion we need is that of composition of transformations: we postulate that some (but not all) 
transformations are composable (in a given order) and that their composition (when it exists) brings about 
another transformation. This operation can be equally thought of in terms of a decomposition of a given 
transformation into elements. For example, the transformation h of a caterpillar’s egg into a butterfly is 
composed of the transformation f of the egg into the caterpillar and the transformation g of the caterpillar into 
the butterfly, in symbols h=fg. This composition can be represented by the following self-explanatory 
diagram:
Obviously one cannot compose f and g in the opposite order or compose any of  f, g with h: such 
compositions are not available in the given example. Beware that the above description of composition is 
preliminary and incomplete as well as the description of the notion of functor given so far. A suggestive 
possibility, which I shall not explore here, is to treat the categorical  composition as a transformation rather 
than introduce it as a separate primitive.   
Next we introduce the notion of stop or “zero transformation”; we shall call stops identity functors, objects or 
categories interchangeably. We shall use dots to represent stops.We postulate that any transformation begins 
and ends with a stop, possibly the same. This strong assumption makes all our transformations in a sense 
discrete.  Perhaps lifting this assumption may give us generalized notions of functor and category but as I 
have promised I shall stick here to its usual well-established version.    
Transformation f from the above example begins with stop e (the egg) and ends up with stop c (the 
caterpillar). However pointing to the source and the target of a given transformation, generally, does not 
determine this transformation: given two stops there are, generally, more than one transformation between 
them in a chosen direction:
What matters is not only where a given transformation begins and where it ends but also how it goes.  To 
read the above diagram correctly one shouldn’t introduce into it additional points for free. The two arrows 
shown at this diagram are not supposed to be determined point-wise; they share all their points, namely their 
source and their target, and yet they are different. 
The notion of composition introduced earlier helps us to give this more precise definition: A stop i as a  
transformation such that fi = f and ig = g whenever compositions fi and ig exist.  Now we are in a position to 
formulate the condition of composability of transformations more precisely: transformations f and g are 
composable if and only if one of these transformations begins exactly where the other transformation ends; 
“where” refers here to a particular stop. To complete this intuitive introduction of basic categorical concepts 
one needs only to add that the composition of transformations is associative. A category is just another word 
for a stop. Notice that in the proposed setting the notion of functor is more fundamental than that of category.
Usually a category is defined as a class of objects provided with a class of classes of maps (“map” is another 
word for transformation) corresponding to all ordered pairs of objects. Then follow examples of categories 
like the category of all sets, all groups, etc. (I have described the notion of category in this way in the 
beginning of Section 7.) This approach is not appropriate for categorical mathematics for two reasons: first, 
because the primitive notion of class is both unwanted and unnecessary here and, second, because in the 
categorical mathematics all categories are categories of categories rather then categories of anything else. 
The following analogy with the set-theoretic mathematics helps to clarify this important point. As far as the 
notion of set is not supposed to provide a foundation for mathematics one thinks of sets after examples of sets 
of numbers, sets of points and the like. But in a foundational axiomatic theory of sets like ZF there is no other 
sets but sets of sets and every mathematical object like a number or a point is supposed to be a set. Similarly 
in a foundational axiomatic theory of categories there is no other categories but categories of categories and 
every mathematical object is supposed to be a category. Interestingly in my proposed setting there is no place 
for anything like  “the” category of categories, i.e. the totality of all categories. In fact Lawvere’s basic 
theory doesn’t require such a thing. It is sufficient for it to stipulate the existence of categories  0, 1, 2, 3, 4 
and the corresponding functors using the preliminary intuitive notions of category and functor introduced as 
suggested above. 
The reader may have noticed that I avoid using the term “morphism” in this part of the paper. I do this for 
two reasons. First, because this term suggests thinking of transformations as structure-preserving map, which 
is irrelevant in the given context. Second, because the term “functor” is commonly used to denote a 
transformation of categories and all the transformations I am talking about are indeed transformations of 
categories.   
We see that the notion of category can be introduced informally just like the notion of collection, and that the 
former notion doesn’t require the latter for its introduction. However this preliminary step doesn’t complete 
the task of building categorical foundations. We still need Lawvere’s basic theory or something similar for 
making our notions of functor and category more explicit. At this crucial step we cannot any longer proceed 
with purely intuitive considerations but need some logical means for making precise definitions and proving 
basic facts. I shall not try to complete this technical part of the job in this paper but only describe some 
possible strategies of doing this. One possible strategy is to push the informal considerations further forward 
and get the notion of cartesian closed  category or topos, so one may use its internal logic for specifying the 
categories  0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and developing the rest of the basic theory.  Another possible solution that seems me 
more promising is to develop  the “language of diagrams” used by Lawvere in his basic theory into a genuine 
logical syntax in the vein of (Wells&Bagchi, forthcoming) and  (Diskin&Wolter, forthcoming). Both these 
strategies involve a new understanding of the role of logic in foundations of mathematics. In categorical 
foundations logic is conceived as a machinery of inference strongly dependent on the underlying 
mathematical setting, not as a self-standing system of universal laws of reasoning. This change of the 
traditional conception of logic is analogous to the change of the traditional conception of geometry occurred 
in 19th century when people stopped thinking about “the” geometrical space as a universal container of 
geometrical objects and learned to think about spaces as geometrical objects and about geometrical objects as 
spaces (with the notion of intrinsic geometry of a given geometrical object).  In the first half of 20th century 
people learned to think about systems of logic as objects living in larger meta-logical frameworks. Category 
theory showed how one can think about objects (i.e. appropriate categories) as systems of logic (with the 
notion of internal language of a given category, see Lambek&Scott 1986 for details). This reciprocal move 
that allows one to avoid the bad infinity of meta-meta.....-logic and met-meta....-mathematics in foundations 
of mathematics has a great philosophical importance.   
To conclude this brief discussion of categorical foundations I would like to stress once again that the success 
of any particular foundation of mathematics crucially depends on its contribution to the progress of 
mathematics and more generally to the progress of science. Saying this I don’t count the renewal of 
foundations as a part of this progress (see the Introduction) but consider effects of this renewal on the rest of 
mathematics and science. Set-theoretic structural foundations of mathematics performed very well in this 
sense before they became an obstacle for further progressive developments. It is perhaps too early to judge 
categorical foundations from this viewpoint but the abundance of categorical methods in the today’s research 
mathematics apparently promise categorical foundations a good future.  
In eyes of a working mathematician the claim that every mathematical object is a category may sound like a 
philosophical absurdity just like the often repeated claim that every mathematical object is a set. In the 
following Conclusion I shall make a step toward the common sense of the working mathematician by 
showing how the categorical viewpoint in and on mathematics allows for seeing beyond the categorical 
foundations per se. 
12. Conclusion: a categorical viewpoint in and on mathematics
I hope having convinced the reader that the project of categorical foundations requires a new philosophical 
view on mathematics, which the traditional Structuralism cannot possibly provide. Let me now try to 
summarize this new categorical view by contrasting it against the structuralist view.  What matters in the 
categorical mathematics is how mathematical objects and constructions transform into each other, not what 
(if anything) remains invariant under these transformations.  So categorical mathematics is a theory of 
abstract transformation, not a theory of abstract form. A  theory in categorical mathematics is a generic model 
(Lawvere) rather than a scheme (Hilbert). 
The categorical view on mathematics - as distinguished from categorical foundations of mathematics in the 
sense of the previous Section - suggests a new understanding of the role of history of mathematics in 
mathematics itself. In the above Introduction I have argued that older and recent formulations of Pythagorean 
theorem cannot be identified through a merely linguistic translation. Here I strengthen this claim as follows: 
different versions of this theorem don’t share any invariant content; such invariant content is not necessary in 
order to qualify these formulations as formulations of the same theorem. For the reader’s convenience I quote 
here this example again:
(1) In right-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides 
containing the right angle. (Euclid’s Elements, Proposition 1.47)
(2) If two non-zero vectors x and y are orthogonal then (y - x)2 = y2 + x2. (Doneddu 1965, p.209, slightly modified 
as explained in Note 2)
Since there is no linguistic translation between (1) and (2) one may look for a translation of a different sort. 
Such translations certainly exist but (and this is crucial for my argument) they all go into one direction, 
namely from (1) to (2)! There are many ways in which Euclid’s geometry can be interpreted in modern terms, 
(Doneddu 1965) is just one way of doing this among many others. But there is evidently no way to spell 
modern geometry in Euclid’s terms. (As I have explained in the Introduction we must talk here about 
translation between corresponding theories, not only about translation between separate propositions.) Our 
history in general and our intellectual history in particular is oriented: there is no symmetry between the past 
and the future. Since sound translations between (1) and (2) go in one direction none of them is reversible. 
According to the argument given in the Section 6 this implies that no such translation allows for the 
identification of an invariant. Thus the existence of sound translations between theories doesn’t imply that 
these theories share anything like an invariant content.  There is no essence, no conceptual core preserved by 
the translation of (1) into (2). But why in this case we count them as different versions of the same theorem?
My answer is this: the Pythagorean theorem (as distinguished from its formulations by Euclid and Doneddu) 
is a particular component of the translation of Euclid’s geometry into modern terms proposed by Doneddu, 
which takes (1) into (2). I have in mind the categorical notion of component of functor explained above in the 
Section 9. Mutatis mutandis a similar criterion of identity can be applied to theories and to particular 
mathematical objects. As far as we are talking about translations like (Doneddu 1965), which are made with 
the intent to modernize older mathematical contents, my proposed understanding of the identity of this 
content amounts, roughly, to the identification of this content with its conceptual history. From this point of 
view different versions of the Pythagorean theorem produced at different times with different foundations can 
be described as different temporal stages of the same conceptual entity (i.e. the same collective intellectual 
process) persisting through time. Noticeably this persisting entity doesn’t reduce to the set of its temporal 
stages because such reduction forgets about translations between these stages, which from my categorical 
viewpoint are the most essential. A mathematical notion is not a set of its temporal stages but a category of 
translations between these stages. I would like also to stress that in spite of the tendency to consensus 
alternative foundations of mathematics and alternative theories based on these different foundations can be 
well developed by contemporaries. So what has been just said about translations between mathematical 
theories produced at different epochs also applies to alternative contemporary approaches (Note 16). 
The reader may wonder if promoting categorical foundations of mathematics and insisting on the importance 
of the pedagogical aspect of foundations (in the above Introduction) I suggest another radical reform of 
school mathematics similar to that suggested by enthusiasts  of set-theoretic structural mathematics in 
1960ies. This  latter reform undertaken simultaneously in many countries and known in the US under the 
name of New Maths was an attempt to comply the elementary mathematical education with the current views 
on foundations: kids were supposed to learn about sets and elementary structures rather than solve traditional 
geometrical problems with compasses and ruler and the like (Adler 1972). Later this reform was commonly 
recognized as a pedagogical failure (Kline 1973). 
Although basic elements of Category theory just like elements of Set theory can be learned at early stages of 
mathematical education (see Lawvere&Schanuel 1997) the categorical view on mathematics outlined above 
suggests a different pedagogical strategy. An average today’s elementary mathematical textbook presents a 
mixture of patterns of mathematical reasoning coming from various historical epochs: it usually contains 
some elements of Euclid-style synthetic geometry, some Cartesian-style elementary symbolic algebra, some 
oldish analytic geometry, some elements of Set theory. In my view such a diversity of styles and contents is 
quite justified because older approaches continue play a role in today’s mathematical practice. Pupils 
definitely need to learn something about older ways of doing mathematics, not just learn older mathematical 
contents presented in a recent fashionable form. In other words today’s foundations of mathematics must 
have a historical dimension and include most significant older foundations. Remind Lawvere’s words quoted 
in the Introduction concerning the role of foundations in clarifying  the “origins and generals laws of 
development” of a science. 
A major problem with such historical approach in mathematics education is that it appears to be incompatible 
with the usual notion of axiomatic method. Facing this problem today’s textbooks written after the failure of 
the New Maths often compromise severely against the classical standard of systematicity without suggesting 
any replacement.  
My proposed solution of this problem is this: a modern mathematical textbook should provide few different 
versions of axiomatic method rather than one. Basic patterns of Euclid-style, Cartesian-style, Hilbert-style 
and Bourbaki-style theory-building should be definitely included. Radical differences between these 
approaches should be articulated rather than hidden. The controversial dialectical nature of foundations of 
mathematics should be stressed rather then kept as a Pythagorean secret. Categorical foundations should be 
treated not only as a basis of an important part of recent mathematics but also as a means of organization the 
above diverse contents into a systematic whole. Teaching different ways of doing mathematics the teacher 
should show how to translate between mathematical contents developed on different foundations without 
trying to smooth the differences between these foundations.  Given today’s overwhelming flow of rapidly 
updating information such a translation skill is crucially needed in any domain of activity including 
mathematics.   A coherent translation is possible even when no invariant structure is available.
   
Endnotes:
Note 1: 
Euclid's Elements are often referred to as a typical example of canonical mathematical text. It is often said 
that until recently people used this book as a Bible of geometry. In fact this alleged dump habit never existed. 
To see this it is sufficient to look more precisely into book titled Euclid's Elements, which have been 
published before 19th century. One finds a surprisingly diverse literature under this title. Early publishers and 
translators of Euclid's Elements tried to produce a sound mathematical textbook rather than reproduce a 
canonical text. They didn’t hesitate to improve on earlier editions of the Elements when they judged this 
appropriate. According to today’s common standard the existing early editions of the Elements don’t qualify 
as different versions of the same text. Any of these people could get today a copyright as the author of his 
Euclid's Elements. The notion of being an author is certainly changed since then.    
Today's canonical Greek edition of Euclid's Elements has been produced  by Heiberg and his assistant Menge 
only in the end of 19th century (see Euclides 1883-1886); noticeably these people were philologists, not 
mathematicians. So the idea to reproduce Euclid's text literally and translate it into modern languages 
"keeping its content invariant" is relatively recent; it is relevant to history of mathematics rather than to 
mathematics itself.
It should be also stressed that since 17th century (a modernized version of) Euclid's Elements was no longer 
the only geometry textbook on the market. Arnauld and some other authors produced their own original 
textbooks.   
Note 2: 
The original version reads
Two non-zero vectors x and y are orthogonal if and only if (y - x)2 = y2 + x2.
I use for my example only the "only if" part of the statement. Euclid counts the converse of his 1.47 as a 
separate Proposition 1.48. Doneddu makes both propositions into one theorem. I have modified Donnedou's 
theorem because this obvious difference is irrelevant to my argument.   
Note 3:
By structural mathematics I understand mathematics build on foundations complying with principles of 
Mathematical Structuralism. A canonical example of structural mathematics is given by (Bourbaki 1939 - 
1983). 
 
Note 4:
We are now ready to spell the precise definition: an infinite cyclic group is a group with an infinite number of 
elements and such that any of its elements is generated  by some distinguished element g and its inverse g'. A 
group is said to be generated by a set of its distinguished elements called generators when every element of 
this group is a product of the generators. A canonical example of infinite cyclic group is the additive group of 
whole numbers, which is generated by 1 and -1.       
Note 5:
Notice that the order, in which transformations are composed, matters. I use here the so-called geometrical 
notation where the composition is written in the "direct" order. According to another notation called 
algebraic the composition is written in the inverse order.
Note 6:
Frege's example is the concept of direction build as follows. One considers the class of all straight lines on 
Euclidean plane and the equivalence relation "is parallel". Then one associates a single abstract  concept 
called direction with each isomorphism class of parallel lines.   
Note 7:
I elaborate on this issue in (Rodin 2007)
Note 8:
I mention here groups of isomorphisms (not to be confused with isomorphisms of groups!) because they are 
very important in geometry and physics. I mean  groups of geometrical transformations of a given space. 
Only reversible geometrical transformations, i.e. geometrical isomorphisms, of a single object (the given 
space) form groups (with the composition of transformations as group operation) because in this case the 
reversibility is equivalent to the existence of inverse elements. So the talk of invariants of groups, which is so 
important for structural approaches in physics, concerns only reversible transformations and doesn’t apply to 
geometrical (or other) transformations in general. A non-mathematical reader may skip the reference to 
groups of isomorphisms in this part of the paper. I shall explain the idea of group of isomorphisms more 
clearly in categorical terms in Section 8.  
Note 9:
Categorical definition of isomorphism resembles the definition of reversible transformation given in the end 
of Section 4. However it doesn't involve a reference to elements. Think about groups G, G' as objects of a 
category and modify the definition of Section 4 in this way: ii' = 1G and i'i = 1G' where   1G is the identity 
morphism of G and 1G'  is the identity morphism of G'. The rest of the definition remains the same. 
Note 10:
A further step of such categorical analysis amounts to considering the full category of functors of the given 
form; such a functor category provides a precise information about how A translates into B.
Note 11:
A categorical diagram is said to commute or be commutative when the compositions of all morphisms shown 
at the given diagram produce other morphisms shown at the same diagram in appropriate places, so that any 
ambiguity about results of the compositions is avoided. For example, saying that the triangle 
is commutative is simply tantamount to saying that fg = h.  
Morphisms resulting from composition of shown morphisms can be omitted at a commutative diagram when 
this doesn’t lead to an ambiguity. For example, saying this this square 
is commutative is tantamount to saying that fg = hi. 
Note 12:
Isbell in his review (1967) of (Lawvere 1966) points to a technical flaw in Lawvere’s proof of this theorem . 
This flaw is fixed, in particular, in (McLarty 1991).   
Note 13:
Does this mean that Ehresmann misconceived of his own invention when he thought of Sketch theory as a 
general theory of structure? I don't think so. A general theory of structure should not be necessarily a 
structural theory and should not provide a support for Structuralism as a philosophical view about 
mathematics.   
Note 14:
Cantor’s first publication related to Set theory (1872) concerned trigonometric expansions. There are also 
strong reasons to trace the history of Cantor’s set concept back to Riemann’s concept of manifold, see 
(Ferreirós 1999).    
Note 15:
Any trajectory in space can be followed in both directions; any spatial motion has a reverse motion. This is 
how we think about spatial motions no matter which mathematical notion of space (Euclidean space, 
Riemanean manifold, ...) if any supports this thinking.  The case of a black hole involves a space-time, not 
merely a space, and points to a deep problem in foundations of physics, which I cannot discuss here.
Note 16:
A more precise criterion of identity of mathematical content developed along these lines would require a 
more precise account of what counts as a sound translation of one piece of mathematics into another. I cannot 
provide it in this paper and leave for a future work.
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